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Introduction
This paper studies consumption and savings pro les and security market prices in a permanent income model when consumers are robust decision makers. Robust decision makers and expected utility maximizers share a common probabilistic speci cation of the income shocks. But robust decision makers suspect speci cation errors and want decisions to be insensitive to them. We show how a preference for robustness lies concealed within the quantity implications of the permanent income model and how it can be revealed by market-based measures of`risk-aversion'. We aim to show that large market-based measures of risk aversion can emerge from concern about small speci cation errors.
We reinterpret the decision rules for saving and consumption from a rational expectations version of Hall's (1978) permanent income model with habit persistence. We show how a robust decision maker with a lower discount factor would use those same decision rules for saving and consumption. 2 Increasing the preference for robustness stimulates a precautionary motive for savings, 3 an e ect that an appropriate decrease of the discount factor cancels. 4 Our empirical strategy comes from the preceding observational equivalence result. To determine all but two parameters of the model, we estimate the rational expectations version of a habit-persistent version of Hall's model from aggregate U.S. time series on consumption and investment. By construction, our model with a preference for robustness must t these quantity data as well as Hall's. But it has di erent implications about 1 Descartes (1901, p. 227) . 2 Our setting relates to the max-min utility theory of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Epstein and Wang (1994) . A robust decision maker uses rules that work well for a speci c stochastic environment, but that are also insensitive to small perturbations of the probabilistic speci cation (see Zames (1981) , Francis (1987) , and Zhou, Glover, and Doyle (1996) ). Similarly, by ascribing a family of possible probability laws to a decision maker, the literature draws a sharp distinction between Knightian uncertainty and risk. Knightian uncertainty corresponds to the perturbations in the probabilistic speci cation envisioned by the robust control theorists. 3 Under a rational expectations interpretation, Hall's model excludes precautionary savings, as emphasized by Zeldes (1989) . 4 In e ect, we are solving a particular`robust control' version of an`inverse optimal decision' problem. Versions of such problems have played an important role in the development of rational expectations theory. See Muth (1960) . See Hansen and Sargent (1983) and Christiano (1987) for developments building on Muth's work. prices of risky assets. In particular, at the consumption/savings plan associated with Hall's model, the shadow prices of a robust decision maker put the market price of risk much closer to empirical estimates. After estimating Hall's model from the quantity data, we use some asset prices to calibrate the discount factor and a robustness parameter, while preserving the implications for saving and consumption.
In contrast to models in the spirit of Bewley (1977) , market incompleteness plays no role in our decentralization of the permanent income model. Instead, following Hansen (1987) , we interpret the permanent income decision rule in terms of a planning problem whose consumption and investment processes are equilibrium allocations for a competitive equilibrium. We then deduce asset prices as did Lucas (1978) and Epstein (1988) by nding shadow prices that clear security markets. These asset prices encode information about the slopes of intertemporal indi erence curves passing through the equilibrium consumption process, and therefore measure the risk aversion of the consumer. To accommodate robustness, our decentralization copies Epstein and Wang's (1994) . 5 To model robust decision making requires formulating a class of misspeci cations that worry the decision maker. We obtain a workable class of misspeci cations by using the literature on risk-sensitive control started by Jacobson (1973 Jacobson ( , 1977 and extended by Whittle (1981 Whittle ( , 1982 Whittle ( , 1983 Whittle ( , 1990 ) and ourselves (1995) . Originally this literature did not seek to model robustness but rather sought to magnify responses to risk under rational expectations. The idea was to induce bigger e ects of risk on decision rules (i.e., greater departures from certainty equivalence) by altering a single risk-sensitivity parameter that in uences the intertemporal objective function. But risk-sensitive preferences can be reinterpreted as embedding a wish for robustness against a class of perturbations of the transition dynamics. For undiscounted linear-quadratic control problems, Glover and Doyle (1988) showed how a particular kind of concern for robustness connects to the risk-sensitive formulation of preferences. They showed how the risk sensitivity parameter measures the size of the class of misspeci cations against which robustness is sought. We use a discounted version of James's (1995) notion of robustness. In this paper, we prefer to interpret our results in terms of a decision maker's concern for robustness. However, because we use a formulation of robust decision theory induced by the risk-sensitivity parameterization, an interpretation in terms of risk-sensitive preferences is also available. 6 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the necessary decision theory. We link risk-sensitive and robust decision theories by displaying two closely connected value functions associated with super cially di erent problems. The problems 5 See Melino and Epstein (1995) for an alternative attack on this same question. They use a recursive formulation of an {contamination speci cation adapted from the theory of robust statistics. 6 To avail ourselves of this interpretation requires that we model risk sensitivity with discounting in a recursive manner, as in Epstein (1988) , Weil (1989) , Epstein and Zin (1989) and Hansen and Sargent (1995) . Epstein and Zin (1989) developed a version of recursive utility theory that raises the market price of risk without altering the intertemporal substitution elasticity. Van Der Ploeg (1993) introduced risk sensitivity into a permanent income model, but not in a recursive manner. 2 lead to identical decision rules. The second problem embodies a preference for robustness, provides links to Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) version of Knightian uncertainty, and explains the quote from Descartes. In sections 3 and 4, we describe and estimate our permanent income model. The observational equivalence proposition of section 4 motivates a two part strategy for using the quantity and asset price data. Section 5 exploits the links between robustness and risk-sensitivity in developing asset pricing formulas in terms of probability measures induced by`pessimistic' views of laws of motion that emerge as by-products of robust decision making. These formulas prepare the way for our interpretations of the market price of risk in terms of robustness. Section 6 quanti es the amount of preference for robustness required to push up the market price of risk. Section 7 measures intertemporal mean-risk trade-o s associated with di erent amounts of concern with robustness. Section 8 concludes.
Recursive Risk Sensitive Control
The theory rests on two closely related recursive linear quadratic optimization problems. We describe a distortion of beliefs away from rational expectations that induces the same behavior as a particular modi cation of preferences toward risk. The equivalence of these two problems lets us interpret a`risk sensitivity' parameter as measuring a preference for robustness. Epstein and Zin (1989), Weil (1993) , and Hansen and Sargent (1995) , we use the following recursion to induce intertemporal preferences:
where R t (U t+1 ) 2 log E exp U t+1 2 jJ t ]:
3 When = 0 we take R t E(U t+1 jJ t ), and we have the usual von Neumann-Morgenstern form of state additivity. When 6 = 0, the operator R t makes an additional risk adjustment over and above that induced by the shape of u( ; ). Values of less than zero correspond to more aversion to risk vis a vis the von Neumann-Morgenstern speci cation.
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As emphasized by Hansen and Sargent (1995) , the (log; exp) speci cation links the general recursive utility speci cation of Epstein and Zin (1989) to risk-sensitive control theory. Weil's (1993) permanent income model used the same (log; exp) speci cation but did not exploit connections to the risk-sensitive control literature. The risk sensitive control problem is to maximize the time zero utility index U 0 by choosing a control process i t adapted to J t . Let W(x) denote the optimum value function for this problem, so that U e 0 = W(x 0 ) where the e superscript is used to distinguish the e cient or optimal utility index. Hansen and Sargent (1995) extended the JacobsonWhittle risk-sensitive control theory to provide formulas for and in the following representation of the value function: U e t = W(x t ) = x 0 t x t + :
Let i = ?Fx denote the optimal decision rule. Let A = A ? BF be the closed loop transition matrix (i.e., with i t = ?Fx t substituted into the original transition law). We display explicit formulas for the distorted expectation operator below.
We shall have cause to evaluate R t (U t+1 ) for the quadratic value function (4) where is a negative semide nite matrix of real numbers and is a nonpositive real number. It follows from Jacobson (1973) 
Robustness reinterpretation
We can reinterpret risk-sensitive preferences in terms of a decision maker with ordinary preferences who fears speci cation errors. The robustness interpretation is based on 7 As in Kreps and Porteus (1978) , this recursive utility formulation overturns the indi erence to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty inherent in state-separable preferences. The additional risk adjustment for < 0 implies a preference for early resolution of uncertainty. 4 a recursive formulation of a zero-sum two-player Lagrange multiplier game whose value functionW(x) relates to W(x). Parameterizing the game in terms of a xed Lagrange multiplier makes a sequential version of the game, under the Markov perfect equilibrium concept, have the same outcome as a version where players can precommit at time zero.
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In this game, one player chooses decision rules for the control vector fi t g, with two di erences vis a vis the single agent risk-sensitive control problem. First, a maximizing player makes no risk adjustment in the utility function. Second, another minimizing player injects a distortion each time period into the conditional mean of the shock process. Thus, the rst player maximizes a utility indexŨ 0 = E 0 P 1 t=0 t u(i t ; x t ) by choice of statefeedback rules for fi t g and subject to the distorted law of motion x t+1 = Ax t + Bi t + C(w t+1 + v t );
where v t distorts the mean of the innovation. The second player chooses a feedback rule for v t to minimizeŨ 0 subject tô
where 0 is given and t serves as a continuation pessimism bound at date t. In (8a), E t ( ) denotes the conditional expectation taken with respect to the law of motion (7), which relative to (1) is distorted by the presence of v t . The second player is introduced as a device to determine the conditional mean distortions fv t g in a way that delivers a particular form of robustness. Letting v t feed back on x t , including its endogenous components, allows for a wide class of misspeci cations. We want the feedback rule for i t to be insensitive to mistakes v t in the conditional mean of w t+1 . To promote insensitivity, we make the second player malevolent and instruct him to minimizeŨ 0 over state feedback rules for v t . We impose restriction (8b) by formulating a multiplier game. In particular, we let ?1= 0 be a Lagrange multiplier on the time t constraint (8a) and require that the continuation pessimism level t be such that the multiplier is constant over time.
9 Condition (8b) accomplishes this. This leads to a recursive formulation of the game. The Markov 8 Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (AHS) (1998) describe a di erent class of speci cation errors that leads to the same risk adjustment (3). AHS permit speci cation errors in the form of perturbations to a controlled Markov process. AHS use a constraint on the size relative entropy to parameterize the admissible class of misspeci cations. Their formulation applies to nonquadratic objective functions and nonlinear laws of motion. They also formulate the connection between risk-sensitivity and robustness in continuous time.
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See Hansen and Sargent (1998) for more details. 
where the E operator integrates w with respect to a normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix I . Hansen and Sargent (1998) show that the value functions W andW share the same matrix in their quadratic forms, but have di erent constants and~ . Let i = ?Fx; v = Gx denote the policy rules that solve (9); the rules are linear, and the rule for i also solves the risk-sensitive control problem.
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The relationship between the two value functions and the decision rules for i establishes how the risk-sensitive preference speci cation induces the same behavior that would occur without the risk-sensitivity adjustment to preferences, but with the pessimistic view of the conditional mean of innovations (the v t 's) re ected in (9). The risk-sensitivity parameter sets the constant Lagrange multiplier ? ?1 on restriction (8). Notice how 0 indexes the degree of pessimism, i.e., the size of the domain of sequences from which the malevolent opponent selects adverse v t 's. Hansen and Sargent (1998) describe in detail why it is convenient computationally to parameterize pessimism in this way.
Uncertainty aversion' or robustness
The Markov perfect equilibrium summarized by (9) is the value function for a single decision maker whose decisions are governed by a`worst case' analysis. By using a feedback rule for i t that solves (9), the robust controller does better for some appropriately constrained mistake sequences fv t g while sacri cing utility when these mistakes are absent. Our treatment of this robustness and its connection to risk sensitivity follows James's (1995) recent survey of robust control, except that we have incorporated discounting into the risk sensitive formulation of the problem and into the corresponding constraints on the model misspeci cation.
There is a closely related literature in economics originating with the work of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Epstein and Wang (1994) . The decision theory axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler generalizes expected utility theory by studying a setting where decisions are based on a`maxmin' criterion because beliefs are described by a family of probability measures rather than a single probability measure. In our setup, there is a`nominal model' corresponding to setting v t = 0 for all t. Alternative speci cation error sequences fv t g constrained by (8) deliver the resulting family of stochastic processes used in the state evolution equation. Hence our decision maker can be viewed as having 10 Hansen and Sargent (1998) discuss how the particular parameterization of`uncertainty aversion' embedded in (9) { in which the`Lagrange multiplier' ? ?1 is time invariant { requires choosing the continuation pessimism bounds t in a way to make the opponent's decision problem recursive. 6 preferences represented by the maxmin utility theory of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . Following Epstein and Wang (1994) , we can interpret the nonuniqueness of the stochastic constraints as depicting a form of Knightian uncertainty: an ambiguity of beliefs not fully speci ed in probabilistic terms but described by the set of speci cation errors fv t g de ned by restriction (8).
In intertemporal contexts, Epstein and Wang (1994) use a Markov formulation of the two-player game to avoid inducing a form of time inconsistency. We follow the literature on robust control by holding xed the Lagrange multiplier ? ?1 on the speci cation error constraint over time. Below, we shall compute the v t 's and use them to measure the amount of uncertainty aversion associated with alternative values of . We avail ourselves of a formula for the matrix G in v = Gx.
Solution for v
The solution for v within the Markov perfect equilibrium satis es:
where x t+1 = A x t + Cw t+1 under the optimal control law for the risk-sensitive problem (A = A ? BF). (Here we are assuming that the parameter is su ciently small that the matrix (I ? C 0 C) is positive de nite.)
11
Below we shall computev t and study how it alters measures of risk aversion extracted from asset prices.
Modi ed certainty equivalence Whittle (1981) pointed out how the solution for v supports a modi ed version of certainty equivalence. This version asserts the equivalence of two ways of evaluating timeinvariant decision rules i t = ?Fx t , one under rational expectations and risk-sensitive preferences; the other under distorted expectations and ordinary ( = 0) quadratic preferences. Recall that A = A?BF , and let R = R+F 0 QF . The two valuation algorithms are:
1. U e t = ?x 0 t R x t + R t U e t+1 , where R t is de ned in (3), and where the conditional expectation operator in (3) is computed with respect to the (true) law of motion x t+1 = A x t + Cw t+1 . The criterion can be represented as the translated quadratic form 11 Although the matrix depends implicitly on , it can be shown that the requisite positive de niteness will be satis ed for small values of . The risk-sensitive control theory literature draws attention to the breakdown point under which this positive de niteness property ceases to hold (e.g., see Glover and Doyle (1988) ). At such points, the risk-adjusted recursive utility is ?1 regardless of the controller's action.
The general equilibrium aspects of our analysis lead us to look at much smaller risk corrections than are tolerated by the breakdown analysis.
7 U e t = x 0 t x t + , where the matrix and the scalar are xed points of operators de ned by Hansen and Sargent (1995 (12) The formula forÂ is derived by adding Cv t to A , wherev t satis es (10). The criterioñ U t has the representationŨ t = x 0 t x t +~ , where is the same matrix occurring in the rst representation. Evidently, these two evaluations yield the same ordering over time-invariant decision rules i t = ?Fx t . This is the modi ed certainty equivalence principle. Notice the appearance of , computed from the rst formulation, in the construction of the distorted law of motion (12). We shall useÂ from (12) again in computing asset prices. Hall (1978) , Campbell (1987) , Heaton (1993) , and Hansen, Roberds, and Sargent (1991) studied how closely a permanent income model approximates aggregate data on consumption and investment. We formulate a risk-sensitive version of the permanent income model with habit persistence, estimate it from data on consumption and investment, then use it to compare the implications of risk-sensitivity for consumption, investment, and asset prices. We demonstrate an observational equivalence proposition asserting that the consumption and investment data alone are insu cient simultaneously to identify the risk-sensitivity parameter and the subjective discount factor . This observational equivalence substantiates our claim to be reinterpreting decision rules from a habit-persistence version of Hall's model in terms of robust decision making. Adding knowledge of the risk-free rate, which is constant in this model, does not achieve identi cation. But later we will show that the risk-sensitivity parameter has strong e ects on other asset prices, including the market price of risk.
Robust Permanent Income Theory
The lack of identi cation from consumption and investment data emerges as follows. For a given speci cation of shocks, introducing risk sensitivity provides an additional precautionary motive for saving. In terms of implications for savings, this motive can be o set by diminishing the subjective discount factor to make saving less attractive. In terms of e ects on the valuation of risky assets, these changes are not o setting.
The model
We formulate the model in terms of a planner with preferences over consumption streams fc t g 1 t=0 , intermediated through the service stream fs t g. Preferences are ordered by the utility index U 0 , de ned through the recursion
where R t (U t+1 ) is de ned by (3).
In (13), s t is a scalar household service produced by the scalar consumption c t via the household technology
where > 0 and h 2 (0; 1). In (13), fb t g is an exogenous preference shock process.
System (14) accommodates habit persistence or rational addiction as in Ryder and Heal (1973) , Becker and Murphy (1988) , Sundaresan (1989) , Constantinides (1990) and Heaton (1993) . By construction, h t is a geometric weighted average of current and past consumption. Setting > 0 induces intertemporal complementarities. Consumption services depend positively on current consumption, but negatively on a weighted average of past consumptions, an embodiment of`habit persistence'.
There is a linear production technology c t + i t = k t?1 + d t where the capital stock k t at the end of period t evolves according to k t = k k t?1 + i t ; i t is time t gross investment, and fd t g is an exogenously speci ed endowment process.
The parameter is the (constant) marginal product of capital, and k is the depreciation factor for capital. Solving the capital evolution equation for investment and substituting into the linear production technology gives:
We de ne: R k + which is the physical (gross) return on capital taking account of the fact that capital depreciates over time. When the economy is decentralized, R will also coincide with the 9 gross return on a risk free asset. We impose that the components of the solution for fc t ; h t ; k t g belong to L 2 0 , the space of stochastic processes fy t g de ned as: L 2 0 = fy : y t is in J t for t = 0; 1; and E 1 X t=0 R ?t (y t ) 2 j J 0 < +1g:
We suppose that the endowment and preference shocks (d t ; b t ) are governed by b t = U b z t ; d t = U d z t where z t+1 = A 22 z t + C 2 w t+1 :
Here w t+1 is independent of J t = fw t ; w t?1 ; : : : ; w 1 ; z 0 g, the eigenvalues of A 22 are bounded in modulus by unity, and w t+1 is normally distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix I .
Given k 0 , the planner chooses a process fc t ; k t g with components in L 2 0 to maximize U 0 subject to (14), (15).
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Solution of model and identi cation of To establish observational equivalence for the quantity observations, we proceed constructively. First, we compute a solution for = 0 and R = 1, i.e., a permanent income economy without risk sensitivity. Then we use the allocation for this = 0 economy to construct an equivalence class of alternative ( ; )'s that generate the same allocation, for xed values of all the other parameters. This demonstrates that the pair ( ; ) is not identi ed from quantity observations alone. The = 0; R = 1 benchmark case To produce a permanent income model in the = 0 special case, we follow Hall (1978) and impose that R = 1. When = 0, (13) and (3) Formulate the planning problem as a Lagrangian by putting random Lagrange multiplier processes of 2 t st on (14a), 2 t ht on (14b), and 2 t ct on (15). First-order necessary 12 We can convert this problem into a special case of the control problem posed in section 2 as follows.
Form a composite state vector x t by stacking h t?1 , k t?1 and z t , let the control i t be given by s t ? b t . Solve (14a) for c t as a function of s t ? b t , b t and h t?1 and substitute into equations (14b) (14), and rearrange to get the system c t = 1
Notice that (22) makes st depend on a geometric average of current and future values of b t . Therefore, both the optimal consumption service process and optimal consumption depend on the di erence between b t and a geometric average of current and expected future values of b. So there is no`level e ect' of the preference shock on the optimal decision rules for consumption and investment. However, the level of b t will a ect equilibrium asset prices.
Observational equivalence (for quantities) of = 0 and 6 = 0
At this point, we state the following Observational Equivalence Proposition: Fix all parameters except and . Suppose R = 1. There exists a < 0 such that the optimal consumption-investment plan with = 0 is also the optimal consumption-investment plan for any satisfying < < 0 and a smaller discount factor^ ( ) that varies directly with .
This proposition means that, so far as the quantities fc t ; k t g are concerned, the risksensitive ( < 0) version of the permanent income model is observationally equivalent to the benchmark ( = 0) version. This insight will guide our estimation strategy, because it sharply partitions the impact of risk-sensitivity into real and pricing parts.
The proof of the proposition is by construction.
Proof: This is the plan of the proof. Begin with a solution f s t ; c t ; k t ; h t g for a benchmark = 0 economy. Form a comparison economy with a 2 ; 0], where is the boundary of an admissible set of 's to be described below. Fix all parameters except ( ; ) the same as in the benchmark economy. Conjecture that f s t ; c t ; k t ; h t g is also the optimal allocation for the < 0 economy. Finally, construct a =^ that veri es this conjecture.
Here are the details of the construction. The optimality of the allocation implies that E t ct+1 = ct , and that (18) and (22) are satis ed for the ( ) benchmark allocation, where E t is the expectation operator under the correct probability measure. The key idea is to form the distorted expectation operatorÊ t , then choose =^ to make the distorted version of the Euler equation for ct hold at the benchmark ( = 0) allocation.
To compute the distorted expectation operator, we follow the recipe given in formulas (9), (12). First, we have to evaluate the utility index U 0 by using (9). We want to evaluate (13) with s t ? b t ? st and st given by the law of motion (18), which we take as exogenous because the allocation is frozen. We take st as the state. Since there is no control, (9) collapses to 
It follows from (12) that the distorted law of motion for st iŝ E t st+1 =^ st (25) where^
Since ct is proportional to st , it follows that E t ct+1 =^ ct (27) with the same^ given by (26). In terms of the distorted expectation operator, the Euler equation for capital is^ RÊ t ct+1 = ct or^ R^ (^ ) = 1:
Let be the lowest value for which the solution of (24) is real. Then given 2 ( ; 0], there exists a^ satisfying (28) such that for ( ;^ ) the benchmark allocation solves the risk-adjusted problem. Therefore equations (24), (26), and (28) de ne a locus of ( ;^ )'s, each point of which is observationally equivalent to (0; ) for (c t ; k t ) observations, because each supports the benchmark allocation. Furthermore, according to the asset pricing theory to be developed shortly and (28), the price of a sure claim on consumption one period ahead is R ?1 for all t and all ( ;^ ) in the locus. Therefore, these di erent parameter pairs are also observationally equivalent with respect to the risk-free rate.
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In Figure 1 , we report the ( ; ) pairs that are observationally equivalent for our maximum likelihood estimates for the remaining parameters, which we are about to describe.
In this model, the technology (15) ties down the risk-free rate. For a version of the model with quadratic costs of adjusting capital, the risk-free rate comes to depend on , even though the observations on quantities are nearly independent of . See Hansen and Sargent (1996) . for maximum likelihood values of identi ed parameters; is the ordinate, the coordinate.
The observational equivalence depicted in Figure 1 shows that by lowering the discount factor, we can make investment less attractive and thereby o set the precautionary savings motive. As an indication of the important precautionary role for savings in this model, suppose that future endowments and preference shifters could be forecast perfectly. Then consumers would choose to draw down their capital stock. Investment would be su ciently unattractive that the optimal linear rule would eventually have both consumption and capital cross zero.
14 ; 15 Thus our robust control interpretation of the permanent income decision rule delivers a form of precautionary savings absent under the usual interpretation.
For any given pair ( ; ) depicted in Figure 1 , the permanent income decision rule re ects either risk sensitivity or a concern for robustness. The familiar version of the precautionary savings motive focuses on the role of variation in the shocks. This version is delivered in our setup by the risk sensitive decision theoretic formulation. In contrast, the precautionary notion delivered by robust control theory emerges because consumers guard against mistakes in conditional means of shocks. Thus concern for robustness shifts emphasis from second to rst moment properties of shocks.
14 Introducing nonnegativity constraints in capital and/or consumption would induce nonlinearities into the consumption and and savings rules, especially near zero capital. But investment would remain unattractive in the presence of those constraints for experiments like the one we are describing here. See Deaton (1991) for a survey and quantitative assessment of consumption models with binding borrowing constraints.
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As emphasized by Carroll (1992) , even when the discount factor is small relative to the interest rate, precautionary savings can emerge when there is a severe utility cost for zero consumption. Such a utility cost is absent in our formulation. 
Estimation
Di erent observationally equivalent ( ; ) pairs identi ed by our Proposition bear di erent implications about (i) the pricing risky assets; (ii) the amounts required to compensate the planner for confronting di erent amounts of risk; (iii) the amount of model misspecication used to justify the planner's decisions if risk sensitivity is reinterpreted as aversion to Knightian uncertainty. To evaluate these implications, we rst choose parameters, including noise variances, by estimating a = 0 version of our permanent income model, conditioning the likelihood function only on U.S. post-war quarterly consumption and investment data. We estimated the permanent-income model with habit persistence using U.S. quarterly data on consumption and investment for the period 1970I{1996III. Consumption is measured by nondurables plus services, while investment is measured by the sum of durable consumption and gross private investment. 17 We applied the model to data that have been scaled through multiplication by 1:0033 ?t . The scaled time series are plotted in Figure 2 . We estimated the model from data on (c t ; i t ), setting = 0, 16 Our choice of starting the sample in 1970 corresponds to the second subsample analyzed by Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebello (1990) . Thus we have omitted the earlier period of`higher productivity'. We initially estimated a version of the model with a stochastic preference shock over the entire post war time period, but we found that the`productivity slowdown' was captured in our likelihood estimation by an initial slow decline in the preference shock process followed by a slow increase. Our illustrative permanent income model is apparently not well suited to capture productivity slowdowns. Given the empirical results reported in Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebello (1990) , the same could be said of the commonly used stochastic speci cation of Solow's growth model. 17 We used`old data', not chain-weighted indexes. 15 then deduced pairs ( ; ) that are observationally equivalent. We estimated parameters by climbing a Gaussian likelihood function. We formed the likelihood function recursively, and estimated the unobserved part of the initial state vector using procedures described by Hansen and Sargent (1996) .
Under our robustness interpretation, this approach to estimation may be justi ed in one of two ways. First, economic agents may allow for model misspeci cation when making their decisions, even though in fact the model is speci ed correctly during the sample period. Alternatively, economic agents use the (misspeci ed) maximum likelihood criterion for selecting a baseline model around which they entertain small speci cation errors. Under this second interpretation, the formal statistical inference formulas for maximum likelihood estimation require modi cation (see White, 1982) .
We speci ed a constant preference shifter b t = b and a bivariate stochastic endowment process:
Because we are modeling two observed time series as functions of two shock processes, the model would lose its content were we to permit arbitrary cross correlation between the two endowment processes. Therefore, we assumed that these processes are orthogonal. We found that one of the shock processes, d t was particularly persistent, with an autoregressive root of .998. While we doubt that this value is distinguishable from unity, we retained the unconstrained estimate of .998 in our subsequent calculations. The two shocks are parameterized as second order autoregressions. We write them as:
For the transitory processd we experimented with autoregressive processes of order 1, 2, and 3, which revealed the log likelihood values depicted in Table 1 . In the table,`AR1' denotes the rst-order autoregression, and so on. The likelihood values show a substantial gain in increasing the order from 1 to 2, but negligible gain in going from 2 to 3. These results led us to specify a second order autoregression for the transitory endowment process.
Thus the forcing processes are governed by seven free parameters: ( 1 ; 2 ; cd; 1 ; 2 ; c d ; d ). We use the parameter b to set the bliss point. While b alters the marginal utilities, as we noted previously, it does not in uence the decision rules for consumption and investment. Consequently, we xed b at an arbitrary number, namely 32, in our estimation.
The four parameters governing the endogenous dynamics are: ( ; h ; ; ). We set k = :975. We initially did not impose the permanent income restriction, R = 1, but the restriction was satis ed by our estimates, so we proceeded to impose it. That is,
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A previous draft speci ed two stochastic shock processes: an endowment shock, d t , and a preference shock, b t . We have chosen to report results for the bivariate endowment process with a constant preference shifter b in response to a comment from one of the anonymous referees. The results from the preference shock version of our model are available in an earlier version of this paper available at http://riffle.stanford.edu. The values reported di er from twice the log likelihood by a common constant. our estimates con rmed the random walk prediction for both the marginal utility process for consumption goods and the marginal utility process for consumption services. The restrictions that R = 1; k = :975 pin down once is estimated. We chose to impose = :9971, which after adjustment for the e ects of the geometric growth factor of 1:0033 implies an annual real interest rate of 2:5%.
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Maintaining the R = 1 restriction, we estimated the model for di erent values of (and therefore of ). The likelihood increases moderately as rises (and decreases) over a large range of 's. However, over this range other parameters of the model do not change much. Allowing to decrease below the value :9971 would have the primary e ect on our results of increasing the risk-free rate above the already excessive value of 2.5 % per year. Therefore, we chose to x at :9971.
In Table 2 we report our estimates for the parameters governing the endogenous and exogenous dynamics. In Figure 3 we report impulse response functions for consumption and investment to innovations in both components of the endowment process. For sake of comparison, we also report estimates from a no habit persistence ( = 0) model in Table  2 , and the resulting impulse response functions in Figure 4 .
Notice that the persistent endowment shock process contributes much more to consumption and investment uctuations than does the transitory endowment shock process.
19 When = 0 (the expected utility, rational expectations case) we can scale the state variables to account for geometric growth without a ecting the subsequent analysis. However, when < 0, the same transformation has the e ect of imposing a time-varying risk adjustment. This problem does not arise when the single period utility function has a di erent form, say logarithmic. In order to preserve the tractability of the quadratic speci cation, we have decided to proceed despite this problem. Twice log likelihood, the coordinate, as a function of , the ordinate (other parameters being concentrated out). To assess the statistical evidence for habit persistence, in Figure 5a we graph twice the concentrated log likelihood as a function of the habit persistence parameter. Notice the asymmetry of this function, which has a much steeper descent towards zero. A likelihoodbased con dence interval can be deduced by comparing the likelihood deterioration to critical values obtained from the chi-square one distribution. Thus, while values of near zero are implausible, values considerably larger than the maximum likelihood values are harder to dismiss. 19 function of the obtained after concentrating the likelihood function. Estimates of the depreciation parameter h remain around :65 within the more plausible range of 's. We interpret the sharp rise in h as decreases toward zero as an artifact of the fact that h is not identi ed when = 0.
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We put our estimates of the habit persistence parameters, and h , into perspective by comparing them with ones emerging from other empirical studies of aggregate U.S. data. Heaton (1993) nds a comparable value of , but a higher depreciation factor h using a permanent income model without preference shocks t to consumption. Heaton also notes that his h is estimated very imprecisely.
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As an extension to this work, Heaton (1995) estimates a power utility, habit persistence model using consumption and asset market data. In this alternative formulation, he provides evidence for larger values of and a larger depreciation factor h . Again the estimate of h has a large standard error. From Heaton's work, we see that more pronounced habit persistence is estimated only when it is o set in the short run by local durability, a source of dynamics that we ignore. Recently, Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (1995) nd smaller values of and h than ours, although they model production in a di erent and maybe more interesting way than we. Unlike Heaton (1995) and Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (1995) , who use evidence on asset returns to help estimate habit persistence parameters, we estimate the habit persistence parameters using only the data on the consumption and investment quantities in light of our assumption about the risk free interest rate.
Asset Pricing
For the purposes of decentralization, we regard the robust (or risk-sensitive) solution to the permanent income model as the solution to an optimal resource allocation problem. This view point permits us to compute the equilibrium stochastic process of quantities before deducing the prices that clear competitive security markets. We follow Lucas (1978) in assuming a large number of identical agents who trade in security markets. We can price assets by treating the consumption process that solves the robust permanent income model as though it were an endowment process. Because agents are identical, equilibrium prices become shadow prices that leave consumers content with that`endowment process.' The pricing implications under robustness are slightly di erent than those under risk-sensitivity. We will proceed in this section by assuming risk-sensitivity and pointing out where the analysis would di er under robustness.
The state for the model is x t = h t?1 k t?1 z 0 t ] 0 . The equilibrium consumption and service processes can be represented as c e t = S c x t , s e t = S s x t . Represent the endowment and preference shock processes as d t = S d x t ; b t = S b x t . The equilibrium law of motion for 21 Like Christiano, Eichenbaum and Marshall (1991) , Heaton (1993) also studies the implications of time aggregation, which we abstract from, and at the same time he allows for local durability in a continuoustime formulation of the model. 
Key subgradient inequality
We begin our analysis of asset pricing by computing the current time t price of a state-contingent claim to utility U t+1 tomorrow. This component of pricing is trivial when preferences are represented as the usual recursive version of the von NeumannMorgenstern speci cation, but is nontrivial in the case of risk sensitivity. The pricing of state-contingent utility will be a key ingredient for pricing state-continent consumption services tomorrow and ultimately for the pricing of multi-period securities that are direct claims on consumption goods. Let s t be any service process measurable with respect to J t , and U t be the associated utility index. For purposes of valuation, Appendix A establishes the following subgradient inequality: R t (U t+1 ) ? R t (U e t+1 ) T t U t+1 ? T t U e t+1 (31) where T t U t+1 E(V t+1 U t+1 j J t )=E(V t+1 j J t ) (32) and V t+1 exp( U e t+1 =2) :
As elaborated further below, the operator T t acts much like a conditional expectation.
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Combining (31) Depicting prices of derivative claims using distorted expectations is a common technique in asset pricing (e.g., see Harrison and Kreps (1979) ). In our investigation and in Epstein and Wang (1994) , the distortion is also needed to price state-contingent utility.
M s t (b t ? s e t ): (35)
If we regard the marginal utility of services M s t as the price for time t services, then (34) states that any pair (s t ; U t+1 ) that is preferred to (s e t ; U e t+1 ) costs more at time t. This justi es treating M s t as the equilibrium time t price of services, and using T t to value time t + 1 state-contingent utility.
The T t operator can be computed as the conditional expectation of the state in the transformed transition equation:
x t+1 =Âx t +Ĉw t+1 ;
whereĈ satis esĈĈ 0 = C(I ? C 0 C) ?1 C 0 ;
(37) andÂ is given by (12). Given the matricesÂ andĈ , asset prices can be computed using the algorithms described in Hansen and Sargent (1996) . Formula (37) shows that when < 0 and is negative semide nite, the conditional variance associated with the operator T t is always greater than or equal to CC 0 , because an identity matrix is replaced by a larger matrix (I ? C 0 C) ?1 . Thus, to interpret T t as a conditional expectation operator requires both a pessimistic assignment of the conditional mean for the future state vector and an increase in its conditional variance.
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We can interchange the risk sensitivity and the uncertainty aversion interpretations of the optimal resource allocation problem. As shown by Epstein and Wang (1994) , equilibrium asset prices can be deduced by referring to the`pessimistic beliefs' that implement optimal decisions. For the uncertainty aversion interpretation, the counterpart to the T t operator is the distorted conditional expectation operator, call itẼ t , induced by the state transition equation of formula (11). This transition law distorts the conditional mean, but not the conditional variance.
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Pricing multi-period streams
The valuation of the state-contingent utility can be used to evaluate future consumption services. Construct a family of operators by sequential application of T t : S t; = T t T t+1 : : : T t+ ?1
23 It follows from James (1992) that this covariance correction vanishes in the continuous time formulation of the problem. Instead the original covariance structure is used. 24 Epstein and Wang (1994) consider di erent ways of introducing Knightian uncertainty, including ones in which there is an important di erence between the game with time zero commitment and the game with sequential choice. Their speci cation of Knightian uncertainty can result in two-person games in which the`beliefs' are not unique. This leads them to a form of price indeterminacy, which they link to empirical ndings of excess volatility. In our setup, the`beliefs' turn out to be unique and price indeterminacy is absent.
where S t;0 is the identity map. Like T t , S t; can be interpreted as a conditional expectation under a transformed conditional probability measure except that S t; is a time t conditional expectation applied to random variables that are measurable with respect to J t+ .
In the permanent income model below, the consumption good is a bundle of claims to future consumption services. We can use the equilibrium prices of services to deduce corresponding prices of consumption goods. Thus, consider any process fs t g with components in L 2 0 , and let fU t g denote the associated utility process. Let fU e t g denote the utility process associated with the equilibrium service process fs e t g. Then Single-period security pricing A large body of empirical research has focused on pricing one-period securities. Imagine purchasing a security at time t at a price q t , holding it for one time period, then collecting the dividend and selling it at time t + 1 for a total payo p t+1 of the consumption good. The payo and price should satisfy: q t = T t f M c t+1 =M c t ]p t+1 g (42) 23 where M c t = M c x t is the marginal utility of consumption and the formula for M c is given in (41). Under robustness, the price-payo relationship would be given by: q t =Ẽ t f M c t+1 =M c t ]p t+1 g (43) whereẼ t is the distorted conditional expectations operator described above. A formula for q t in terms of the original conditional expectation operator is: q t = E(m t+1;t p t+1 j J t ) (44) where the exact speci cation of m t+1;t will depend upon whether the robustness or the risk-sensitivity interpretation is adopted. The two alternatives will be explored in the next section. The random variable m t+1;t has an interpretation as a one-period stochastic discount factor, or alternatively as an equilibrium intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for the consumption good. The next section will show how risk-sensitivity and uncertainty aversion are re ected in the usual measure of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution being scaled by a random variable (that depends on the interpretation { robustness or risk-sensitivity) with conditional expectation one. We use this multiplicative adjustment to the stochastic discount factor to increase its variability and to enhance risk premia.
From the one-period stochastic discount factor, we can easily deduce the`market price of risk.' For simplicity, think of a one period payo on an asset as a bundle of two attributes: its conditional mean and its conditional standard deviation. In our environment, these two attributes only partially describe asset payo s. Furthermore, we cannot extract unique prices of the attributes, in part because one of the attributes, the standard deviation, is a nonlinear function of the asset payo . Nevertheless, like any stochastic discount factor model, ours conveys information about how these attributes are valued (see Hansen and Jagannathan, 1991) . To see this, consider the covariance decomposition of the right-hand side of (42): q t = E t (p t+1 )E t (m t+1 ) + cov t (m t+1 ; p t+1 ); where cov t denotes the covariance conditioned on time t information. Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality, we obtain the price bound:
where std t denotes the standard deviation conditioned at time t. Along the so-called e cient frontier,' the`price of risk' relative to expected return is given by the ratio: std t (m t+1;t )=E t (m t+1;t ) which is commonly referred to as the market price of risk. This ratio is one way to encode information about how risk averse consumers are at the equilibrium consumption process.
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Appendix C describes how to compute the stochastic process for the market price of risk when is negative under risk-sensitivity. 25 Gallant, Hansen, and Tauchen (1990) , Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) 
Quantifying Robustness from the Market Price of Risk
Because it is not identi ed from data on consumption and investment, other information must be used to restrict the risk sensitivity parameter. In this section, we study how risk sensitivity alters the predicted market price of risk. We then exploit the connection between risk sensitivity and Knightian uncertainty by computing the magnitude of the speci cation errors needed to generate implications comparable to various settings of the parameter . In particular, we show how allowing for mistakes transmits to the equilibrium market price of risk. We are attracted to the interpretation in terms of robustness as a way of confronting an observation of Weil (1989) , who noted how market prices of risk can be enhanced by risk sensitivity, but at the cost of making the implied risk aversioǹ extreme.' Risk aversion has typically been measured by studying choice problems with unique speci cations of the probability laws. That our risk sensitivity parameter has a nearly equivalent interpretation as re ecting aversion to uncertainty raises hopes for reinterpreting implausibly large estimates of risk aversion as coming partly from a`preference for robustness.'
Market price of risk
While the risk-sensitivity parameter and the preference curvature parameter b are (1992) interpret the equity premium puzzle as the large market price of risk implied by asset market data. The market price of risk can be expressed as the least upper bound on Sharpe ratios jE t r t+1 ?r f t j std t (r t+1 ) where r t+1 is a one-period return and r f t is the one-period riskless return. Thus the Sharpe ratio for the one-period return on equity gives a lower bound on the market price of risk.
25 not identi able from quantity data, we now show that they a ect the market price of risk. In Tables 3a and 3b, , we used the Kalman lter to compute E(x t jy t ; y t?1 ; :::; y 1 ) for each time t in our sample. It can be shown that the conditional covariance of the time t state vector given time t information converges to zero, implying that the`hidden' states should be approximately revealed by the observations. Deviations around the means of the implied endowment processes under habit persistence are graphed in Figure 6 . We used these tted states to calculate the median market price of risk over the sample. In Tables 3a and 3b , we report results for the model estimated with and without habit persistence, respectively. The tables show how we can achieve a`target' market price of risk with alternative ( ; b ) pairs. consider, the market prices of risk are very small. The market price of risk can be raised by reducing further the parameter b , but at the cost of enhancing the probability of satiation in the quadratic preference ordering. But increasing j j pushes the model predictions towards more empirically plausible market prices of risk without altering the satiation probabilities.
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Roughly speaking, introducing habit persistence triples (or multiplies by (1 + )) the market price of risk across all of the ( b ; ) speci cations that we study. This conclusion from Table 3b emerges from the estimates from the second (No Habit Persistence) column of Table 2 . There the parameters governing the exogenous dynamics are adjusted to match the temporal covariations of consumption and investment as closely as possible.
Holding xed and increasing the preference translation parameter b also enhances the market price of risk except when is close to zero. To understand this nding, note that under risk sensitivity, the stochastic discount factor can be represented as the product m t+1;t = m f t+1;t m r t+1;t
where m f t+1;t M c t+1 M c t is the`familiar' intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in the absence of risk sensitivity and m r t+1;t exp( U e t+1 =2) E exp( U e t+1 =2)jJ t ] : (See Appendix C for an explicit formula for m t+1;t in terms of the equilibrium laws of motion.) When = 0 this second term is one; for any , it has conditional expectation equal to one. The latter property is what permits us to interpret this second factor as a pessimistic`distortion' of the conditional expectation operator. Finally, recall that the market price of risk is simply the (conditional) standard deviation of m t+1;t divided by its (conditional) mean.
When b is increased and = 0, the single-period utility function is closer to being linear (risk neutral) over the empirically relevant portion of its domain. As a consequence, model to explain one of the glaring empirical failures of consumption-based asset pricing models: the observed lack of correlation between the implied intertemporal marginal rates of substitution and stock market returns. For a description of how to build statistical tests based on market price of risk targets, see Burnside (1994) , Cecchetti, Lamb and Mark (1994) , and Hansen, Heaton and Luttmer (1995) .
It can be argued that risk sensitivity is simply repairing a defect in quadratic preferences, a criticism to which we are certainly vulnerable in this paper. The usual measure of relative risk aversion in the absence of habit persistence is ?cU 00 (c) U 0 (c) . In the case of our quadratic preferences, this is given by , which requires that the bliss point process be twice the consumption level to attain a risk aversion coe cient of one. For an investigation of risk sensitive preferences and logarithmic utility, see Tallarini (1998) . the market price of risk decreases as b is increased (see the rst columns of Tables 3a  and 3b ).
Consider next cases in which fm f t+1;t g is much smoother than fm r t+1;t g, so that the market price of risk is approximately std(m r t+1;t jJ t ). The (conditional) standard deviation of fm r t+1;t g will be large when the distortion in the conditional expectation operator is large. As b increases, the representative consumer's consumption is moved further away from his ideal point and hence the scope for pessimism is more pronounced. Thus increasing b enhances the market price of risk. More generally, the overall impact of increasing b for a xed is ambiguous except when = 0 and depends on the particular features of the calibrated economy. For the calculations reported in Tables 3a and 3b , the median market price of risk increases with b except when is near zero. Market price of risk and robustness
As we have just seen, risk sensitivity introduces an additional (multiplicative) factor m r t+1;t into the stochastic discount factor. This factor changes only slightly when risk sensitivity is reinterpreted as a preference for robustness. When interpreted as a preference for robustness, we can abstract from the covariance enhancement of the shocks. However, relative to those reported in Tables 3a and 3b , the numbers for the market price of risk barely change when computed assuming Knightian uncertainty rather than risk-sensitive preferences.
Let m u t+1;t denote the resulting multiplicative factor, so that the composite stochastic discount factor is: m t+1;t = m u t+1;t m f t+1;t : To aid our understanding, suppose initially that m f t+1;t is constant, so the market price of risk is given by: mpr t = std(m u t+1;t jJ t ):
The rst columns of Tables 3a and 3b suggest that the conditional standard deviation of m u t+1;t is indeed close to zero for the preference speci cation used in our calculations.
Under our particular speci cation of uncertainty aversion, recall that asset prices are computed using the`pessimistic' view of tomorrow's shock vector: w t+1 is normally distributed with conditional meanv t and covariance matrix I wherev t is computed from the solution to the two-person game. It follows that m u t+1;t = exp ?(w t+1 ?v t ) 0 (w t+1 ?v t )=2] exp(?w t+1 0 w t+1 =2) ;
which is the density ratio of the`distorted' relative to the`true' probability distribution. By a straightforward calculation, it follows that E t (m u t+1;t ) 2 ] = exp(v 0 tv t ); 28 and by construction E t (m u t+1;t ) = 1: Therefore, std(m u t+1;t jJ t ) = exp(v 0 tv t ) ? 1] 1=2 jv t j for small distortions. In other words, the market price of risk is approximately equal to the magnitude of the time t speci cation error. Our market prices of risk calculated under uncertainty aversion are only slightly smaller than those computed under risk sensitivity due to the small variance adjustment associated with the operator T t .
To understand better this approximate mapping from the permissible speci cation errors to the market price of risk, consider the following. Under the correct model speci cation, the shock vector is normally distributed and is normalized to have the identity as its covariance matrix. Suppose a misspeci cation takes the form of a conditional mean distortion of say, 10% times a direction vector with Euclidean norm one. This direction vector has the same dimension as the shock vector and picks the direction of the conditional mean distortion. This 10% distortion would alter a Gaussian log-likelihood function by: v t v t 2 = :005 times the number of time periods in the sample. Thus a distortion of this magnitude would be hard to detect using a sample like ours, which consists of a little more than one hundred time periods. Having economic agents allow for distortions of this magnitude gives a market price of risk of approximately :10, assuming that there is no variation in the usually constructed stochastic discount factor. The fact that a mistake in forecasting w t+1 could lead to a direct enhancement of the market price of risk by the magnitude of the mistake is perhaps not surprising. What is conveyed here is that concern for robustness approximately directs the associated pessimism to returns that are conditionally mean{ standard deviation e cient.
More generally, we expect that jv t j is an upper bound on the approximate enhancement to the market price of risk caused by the concern for robustness. Given the`pessimistic' construction of v t , we expect the two components m u t+1;t and m f t+1;t of the stochastic discount factor to be positively correlated. This upper bound is closer to being attained when the two terms are highly positively correlated. Tables 4a and 4b . The tables report the medians inv t as well as minima and maxima over the sample. Like the market prices of risk, these measures are evaluated at the estimated values of the shock processes (d t ; d t ) over the estimation period.
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Recall from our previous discussion that the enhancement of the market price of risk caused by Knightian uncertainty is approximately jv t j. The tables show how jvj is mostly composed of speci cation errors in the shock for the persistent component of income d t .
* Note: minimum and maximum values are in parenthesis below each median. 
Intertemporal Mean-Risk tradeoffs
The market price of risk reported above conveys information about the one-period tradeo between the mean and standard deviation of asset returns as encoded in shadow prices. We now investigate the implied intertemporal tradeo between means and standard deviations associated with our alternative con gurations of b and . Speci cally, given a proportionate increase in the innovation standard deviation of an endowment shock, we aim to compute what proportionate increase in the conditional mean of that component of the endowment is required to keep the social planner on the same indi erence curve. Initially we answer this question`locally' by considering small interventions. This imitates in part local measures of risk aversion. However, local measures of risk aversion are often computed around certainty lines. In our case, we localize around the solution to the permanent income optimal resource allocation problem. Our localization permits us to depict riskaversion as the ratio of two appropriately chosen intertemporal prices. Thus, like the market price of risk, our intertemporal measure of risk aversion also can be interpreted as a price ratio. We supplement this local experiment with a global one in which the 31 standard deviation of the shock is set to zero. The intertemporal vantage point adopted in this section a ects the character of the implied measures of risk aversion. The calculations will be conducted using the`risk-sensitive' decentralization. A corresponding`robust' decentralization gives rise to essentially the same numbers.
Local measure of risk aversion
We form a local intertemporal tradeo between the standard deviation and the mean of the endowment about the equilibrium process for consumption and investment. Specically, given a proportional enhancement of standard deviation of the endowment innovation in all future time periods, we aim to compute what proportional mean increase in the endowment is required to keep the social planner on the same indi erence curve, at least locally. To perform this computation we attain two`value expansions,' both of which we describe below. The rst-order terms or`derivatives' in these expansions can be interpreted as prices of appropriately chosen in nitely lived securities.
We implement a`local' modi cation in the state evolution equation by adopting the parameterization of the law of motion starting for j 0 as
where is a small positive scalar. A positive initiates a change in the innovation standard deviation starting with date t + 1. Here the matrix G is designed to select one of the endowment innovations. For example , it can be identical to C except with zeroes for entries associated with the other endowment shock. Let U t = W (x t ) denote the value function for resulting control problem indexed by ; we take W 0 as the value function for a baseline control problem (say the risk sensitive permanent income model). Let x t+1 = A 0 x t + Cw t+1 be the corresponding = 0 state evolution equation when the optimal control law is imposed. We aim to compute an expansion of the form:
where o( ) converges to zero as tends to zero uniformly on compact subsets of the state space. We will derive an asset pricing formulation of W d that, among other uses, facilitates calculations.
A corresponding experiment delivers a`robust control' expansion. Alter the intervention that takes place at time t by introducing`mistakes' in the conditional mean. Now suppose instead that starting for j 0 we have:
x t+j+1 = A 0 x t+j + (C + G)(w t+1+j + v t+j );
32
As before, the parameter is used to restrain mistakes, rather than to make a risk adjustment in the utility recursion. This perturbed system gives rise to an expansion that, from a quantitative vantage point, is virtually identical to that we report. The subsequent asset pricing interpretation also applies, provided that we use the prices for the`robust' decentralization in place of the prices of the`risk sensitive' decentralization.
Of course, W is a translated quadratic function of the state vector. We write this function as:
W (x) = x 0 x + : The function W d is quadratic:
In e ect, d is the derivative with respect to of the matrix function , evaluated at = 0. Similarly, d is the derivative with respect to of the scalar function . Computations of these derivatives are simpli ed by the fact that we can abstract from the role of optimization of the control vector for small changes in . This familiar property follows from the rst-order conditions satis ed by the optimal control law, which imply that the contribution to the value function expansion is second order in . Hence we can compute the derivatives as if we are holding xed the control law and hence the state evolution matrix A 0 . The matrix d can be computed easily as the solution of a Sylvester equation.
Measuring risk aversion by asset pricing
Holding xed the equilibrium law of motion for consumption, c 0 t = S c x t , we can use our asset pricing formula to evaluate how utility responds to changes in . To compute the desired`derivative' of U t with respect to , we begin by forming a new state vector process: 
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It can be veri ed that as declines to zero, this becomes an equality. Therefore, we can evaluate the desired`derivative' by using the following asset pricing formula:
This is the time t price, scaled in units of marginal utility, of an in nitely-lived security with dividend fS c y t+j g.
28
To compute the local mean-risk tradeo , we also estimate the utility change associated with a small change in the conditional mean of the endowment. We capture this small change as follows:
x t+1 = A 0 x t + Dx t + Cw t+1 x t+j+1 = A 0 x t+j + Cw t+1+j ; for j = 1; 2; : : :. This envisions the change in the conditional expectation as occurring at date t + 1 continuing into the future and leads us to the time t value-function expansion: Again we can show that this subgradient is actually a gradient by driving to zero. Therefore, our target derivative is given by: The transition equation has a block diagonal state matrix with diagonal blocks A 0 . The counterpart to C is constructed by stacking C on top of G. Consumption will be formed by using a matrix ( S c 0 ) and the dividend will be formed by ( 0 S c ). Prices can now be computed recursively using a doubling In Table 5 , we report our (local) intertemporal measures of risk aversion. The e ect of increasing (in absolute value) has a stronger e ect on the mean-risk trade-o than on the market price of risk (compare Table 5 to Table 3a ). Increases in b also have a slightly greater impact for the trade-o calculation. 29 We next verify the local nature of these computations by considering the following experiment. Let = ?1, which sets to zero the shock variance for the endowment process.
By extrapolating the local measures reported in Table 5, the entries in this table should   29 Increasing the market price of risk by enlarging b has the virtue of further reducing the probability of satiation. This would appear to increase the intertemporal substitutability of consumption. However, recall that b does not appear in the permanent income decision rule. Thus, by design we have not changed the consumption{savings behavior of the consumer as we change b . On the other hand, some perverse implications`o the equilibrium path' can occur for large values of b . convey what fraction of the endowment the consumer would be willing to forego to achieve this reduction in volatility. Such an inquiry relates to Lucas's (1987) quanti cation of the welfare costs to uctuations, except that we are using a permanent income model that permits investment (see also Obstfeld (1994) and Tallarini (1998) ). From this vantage point, the numbers in Table 5 look to be enormous, particularly for the larger (in absolute value) speci cations of . However, that extrapolation of our local measure turns out to be misleading. To see this, in Table 6 we report global numbers for the = ?1 experiment that holds xed the permanent income decision rule for the two competing speci cations of the endowment process. The global mean-risk tradeo s are much smaller by a factor ranging from two to four. Nevertheless, the tradeo s remain quite large, except when is close to zero. 
Conclusions
Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1975) warned us about theorists bearing free parameters. Having heard Lucas, we devoted this paper to scrutinizing some of the implications for prices and quantities of a single additional parameter designed to quantify a preference for robustness to speci cation errors. By exploiting the connection between robustness and the risksensitivity speci cation of Jacobson (1973) and Whittle (1990) , we have shown how to decentralize dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium models with a consumer who fears model misspeci cation. Formulas for consumption, investment, and the risk-free interest rate are identical to ones coming from the usual permanent income models. We presented formulas for the market price of risk, then applied them to account for the market price of risk observed in U.S. data.
Like Brock and LeBaron (1996) , Brock and Hommes (1994) , Cochrane (1989) , Marcet and Sargent (1989) , and Krusell and Smith (1996) , we can regard the consumer{investors in our economy as making`mistakes', but as managing them di erently than do those in these authors' models.
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Our agents are very sophisticated in how they accommodate possible 30 The global numbers would be enhanced a little if we reoptimize when setting the endowment shock to zero. The solution to a linear-quadratic problem is unattractive in this context because with less uncertainty, capital ceases to be an attractive way to transform goods from one period to the next. In light of this, it seems crucial to reoptimize subject to a nonnegativity constraint on capital. Our imposition of the suboptimal`permanent income' consumption rule diminishes the impact of this nonnegativity constraint while possibly misstating the global tradeo . 31 Cochrane's (1989) and Krusell and Smith's (1996) agents use decision rules that are perturbed by small amounts in arbitrary directions from optimal ones. Marcet and Sargent's (1989) agents correctly solve dynamic programming problems, but subject to subtly misspeci ed constraints: they use estimated transition laws (usually of the correct functional forms) which they mistakenly take as non-random and time-invariant. See Brock and LeBaron (1996) , especially their footnote 2, for a lucid explanation of a class of models that mix`adaptation' { to induce local instability near rational expectations equilibria { with enough`rationality' to promote global attraction toward the vicinity of rational expectations. Brock and LeBaron (1996) and Brock and Hommes (1994) balance the tension between adaptation and rationality to mimic some interesting return and volume dynamics. mistakes: they base decisions on worse-case scenarios, following Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Epstein and Wang (1994) .
In contrast to Cochrane (1989) and Krusell and Smith (1996) , for our permanent income economy, the quantity allocations are observationally equivalent to those in an economy in which no`mistakes' are contemplated. This situation stems partly from the econometrician's ignorance of the subjective discount factor. Like Epstein and Wang (1994) and Melino and Epstein (1995) , we focus on how aversion to mistakes transmits into security market prices. We nd that a conditional mean`mistake' of x% of a unit norm vector for a multivariate standard normal shock process increases the market price of risk by approximately x=100.
We have concentrated on a robust interpretation of the permanent income model of consumption. The permanent income model seemed a natural starting point for exploring the consequences of robust decision theory, partly because of its simplicity. Recent work by Carroll (1992) has emphasized a departure from the permanent income model induced by precautionary savings, low discount factors, and big utility costs to zero consumption.
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As we have emphasized, our reinterpretation of the permanent income model also relies on smaller discount factors and precautionary savings. It does not, however, permit us to explore the rami cations of big utility costs to zero consumption, which is central to the work of Carroll (1992) and others, and which requires nonquadratic objective functions. However, Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (1998) have shown how the connection between risk sensitivity and robustness extends to discounted control problems with nonquadratic criteria and nonlinear, stochastic evolution equations. They formulate a recursive nonlinear robust control problem that applies readily to consumption and savings decisions.
Maybe we take the representative agent paradigm too seriously. We use the representative agent as a convenient starting point to understand the workings of risk sensitivity and robustness in decentralized economies. In other settings, we know how heterogeneity of preferences and incomplete risk sharing a ect investment behavior and the market price of risk. In our model (and Epstein and Wang's, 1994) , agents agree on the amount and location of the Knightian uncertainty. Thus, models like ours can contribute an additional dimension upon which heterogeneity alters equilibrium quantities and prices.
Appendix A: Subgradient Inequality
This derives the subgradient inequality used for equilibrium pricing. Let U e denote the original nonpositive random utility index, U any other nonpositive random utility index and J a sigma algebra of events. We will show that 32 See Leland (1968) and Miller (1974) (52) Combining (51) and (52) and dividing by , we have that (1= )fE exp( U=2) j J]=E(V e j J)g ? 1 ( =2)E(V e h j J)=E(V e j J)
To complete the derivation, we use the familiar approximation result for logarithms:
lim !0 ( ? 1)= = log( ) (54) where the limit is from above. (This limit can be veri ed by applying L'Hospital's Rule or by using the series expansion for exp log( )]). Taking limits of the left side of (53) (71) whereT t is the transformed conditional expectation operator for a 2 economy. We can evaluate theT t term in the above expression using results from Appendix B:
T (74) Finally, we know that the conditional variance of m t+1;t is given by its conditional second moment minus the square of its conditional mean.
